Network security is becoming a focus in computer security research. One way to maintain the security of computer networks is using network-based Intrusion Detection System (N-IDS). Here, machine learning-based IDS has been gaining more attention than other methods for decades. In more details, feature representation is one of the methods which is used to classify data in machine learning. A small amount of good features is able to increase the accuracy of detection process and also to decrease the cost of computation; and for some cases, it gives the network administrator some idea what needs to do. Some research has been done in order to find good features. Nevertheless, it is relatively not good as represented by its accuracy. This paper proposes a new method to generate a representative feature to classify normal and anomalous connections. In this approach, two types of distance are measured and summed to generate a new feature. The first is the distance whose value is the sum of data item to cluster centers; while the second is the distance whose value is sum of log distance from data to its cluster sub-centroids. This new one-dimensional data is used to classify new data using knearest neighbor classifier. The experimental results, which are obtained by using a subset of KDD99 and Kyoto2006++, are relatively good in terms of accuracy and specificity, those are (99.57%, 99.75%) and (94.84%, 93.53%), respectively.
Introduction
Securing information has been an important factor in designing a computer network. Some aspects in securing information are achieved by encryption [1] , steganography [2] , or biometric authorization [3] . Some network security problems, such as unauthorized access, can be detected by using an intrusion detection system (IDS). The IDS itself can be grouped into two categories. The first is signature-based IDS. This uses a database comprising attack signatures to detect malicious activities. In case the result detection matches the signature, the system delivers the alarm. The second is anomaly-based IDS which uses a normal activity model. Here, the detection result which deviates too much from the specified threshold is considered as an attack. An advantage of anomaly-based over signature based IDS is its capability to detect a new type of attack without firstly knowing the signature; while its disadvantage is that it consumes relatively higher resource than the signature-based IDS because its process is more complex [4] . In addition, according to Garcia-Teodoro et al [4] , anomaly-based IDS has higher false alarm rate than signature-based IDS.
In further resesarch, Garcia-Teodoro et al [4] classify anomaly based IDS into three classes: statisticalbased, knowledge-based, and machine learning-based IDS. This third classs can be further classified into six classes: bayessian networks, markov models, neural networks, fuzzy logic, genetic algorithm, and clustering and outlier detection. As presented by Sommer et al [5] , there are some challenges being faced by machine learning-based IDS, which include:
Outlier detection: most of the machine learning technique use large enough data of the population to train the model. In some outlier detection methods, the model is trained only by using normal data and that which is not fit in the model is assumed as anomaly. High false positive rate: this rate may cause the administrator ignores most of the alarm. If this occurs, the system can be compromised. Some research have address those problems. Lin et al [6] and Tsai and Lin [7] are able to reduce the false alarm rate while maintaining a relatively high detection rate. They, however, have the same issue: the cost of generating feature from data. In this paper, we will address this problem. This is done by developing a recursive k-means clustering using gini impurity index to replace basic k-means clustering of CANN (Combining cluster center and nearest neighbor) [6] and localized k-nearest neighbor. Logdistance to subcentroid is used to make each data in a cluster more differentiable than other data in the same cluster. For this, we use localized k-nearest neighbor to classify the data. In this paper, we define log-distance as a logarithmic function of distance between data. Localized k-nearest neighbor is chosen to minimize the number of training data in the classification phase.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains some related works which have been done. Section 3 depicts our proposed method: i.e. detecting intrusion by using generated features. Section 4 describes the experiment along with its result. The evaluation criteria used are also provided in this section. The conclusions is drawn in Section 5.
Related Works
In order to address some problems in [5] , some research have already been done. Zhang et al [8] and Wang et al [9] propose methods to handle the diversity nature of network traffic by using online clustering. They differ in the number of initial data training. While [8] uses the first 1000 of traffic data to model normal trafic, [9] uses the specified number determined by the user.
As explained by Koc [10] , a detection method is only appropriate to detect a certain type of attacks, and another method is good for another attack. Therefore, ensemble learning is getting more attention. Furthermore, some research with multiple detection models shows better performance than the single ones [10] [11] [12] .
In terms of the feature being used in the detection process, some generation techniques have been proposed. For example, Lin et al [6] propose the CANN method which uses sum of distance between data being evaluated and centroid; and distance between data being evaluated and the nearest neighbor. Tsai and Lin [7] propose TANN (Triangle area and nearest neighbour) method which uses sum of all posible triangle areas resulted by the data being evaluated and any two of five centroids.
Both clustering techniques in [6] and [7] use 5 clusters in their k-means clustering method, and use KDD99 dataset for testing. A possible problem in [6] is that CANN needs to find the nearest neighbor to generate features for both training and testing. On the other hand, finding the nearest neighbor is a costly operation and resource consumption. Furthermore, this overhead can grow polynomially. This problem is minimized by TANN [7] which does not need this operation. However, there is still a possible problem here [7] . That is, a new feature can not be generated by using the old data alone. Rather, it must be built by using combination of both old and new data. This has made TANN only suitable for batch processing.
Another feature generation strategy is proposed in [13] which uses a four angles star. Each vertex in the star represents an anomalous activity.The distances between the data being evaluated and each vertex are measured to generate 4 or 16 new features. This approach, nevertheless, is only appropriate to solve KDD99 related problems. In addition, its performance with 5 or more attack classes is not yet known.
Detecting Intrusion
Our overall proposed method can be depicted in Fig. 1 . It is different from CANN in certain aspects. Firstly, instead of normal k-means as in CANN, we use recursive k-means to generate clusters by using gini impurity index to be a stoping criterion. Gini impurity index formula can be found in (1) where m is the number of labels and f i is the fraction of label i in the cluster. In this method, we specify m=2, which represents normal and anomalous condition.
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(1) Recursive clustering process is done by using k-means clustering on training dataset T where the number of clusters K=2. If the resulted cluster has gini impurity index greater than the specified threshold U, then the cluster is split into 2 clusters by applying k-means. The clustering process is stopped if the impurity index of the cluster is small enough (less than U). After the clusterring process has stopped, the next step is to extract its subcentroids. This extraction process is carried out by using k-means clustering with K=O if the cluster has at least O members; and K=1 if otherwise. Here, O is the user specified number of maximum subcentroid in a cluster. In more details, this process is presented in Fig.2 . The next step is to assign each training data D i in T to its nearest centroid. From this, we get the sum of distance between D i and each cluster centroid; and its log-distance between D i and subcentroid in the respective cluster by using (2) . Here, m is the number of cluster which is obtained from the recursive clustering, n is the number of subcentroid of the cluster which D i belongs to and SC y is the y-th subcentroid of the cluster which D i belongs to. If the distance between D i and SC y is 0, then the subcentroid is skipped. Fig 3 shows how to get the distances. This step generates one dimentional training data D i ' where D i ' T'. The feature generation of testing data S is done by assigning each data D j in S to its nearest centroid. By using centroid and subcentroid extracted from the first step and (2), we extract D j ' where D j ' S'. At the classification step, k-nearest neighbor (k-nn) is employed to group transformed test data D j ' using D i ' of its cluster. It is worth to note that this classification step is not carried out to the whole D i '.
(2) Fig. 2. (a) The first step of clustering generating 2 clusters a and b. (b) Gini impurity index of cluster b is still above the threshold so it is split into two clusters b1 and b2. (c) Cluster b2 still has high gini impurity index, so it is split into b21 and b22. 
Experimental Result
As in other research [12] , [7] [6] [9] [8], we use KDD99 or DARPA dataset for evaluating the proposed method. In addition, we also perform evalution by using Kyoto2006++ dataset [14] which is a public dataset generated from real honeypot data set up as an alternative to KDD99.
Before being used for testing, the preprocessing is applied to both dataset. This is done by selecting meaningfull attributes using chi-squared method. Possible duplicate data is removed from the remaining entities. With the relatively same proportion, the number of data is reduced to 20.000 entities for both databases. The selected feature of KDD99 dataset are src_bytes, dst_bytes, wrong_fragment, hot, count, diff_srv_rate, dst_host_dif_srv_rate, dst_host_same_src_port_rate and label. The selected feature of Kyoto2006++ are duration, source, destination, count, same_srv_rate, srv_serror_rate, dst_host_srv_count and label. The composition of KDD99 subset can be seen in Table 1 and composition of Kyoto2006++ dataset is in Table 2 . The selected data is then split into 10 parts for 10-fold cross validation with each of them has nearly same composition.
The proposed method is evaluated in terms of accuracy, specificity and sensitivity. Accuracy is the ratio of items correctly categorized to all item. Specificity is the ratio of negative item correctly categorized to all negative item. Sensitivity is the ratio of positive item correctly categorized to all positive item. The formula of accuracy, sensitifity and specificity are provided in (3), (4) and (5), respectively. The experiment is performed in Python 2.6 with scipy and numpy package in 64-bit Ubuntu Linux using intel core i5-2410M, 4 GB of RAM. The results of the experiment on KDD99 and Kyoto2006++ dataset are presented in Tables 3 and 4 respectively. It is shown that our proposed method has promising results in all three evaluation criteria. The results of KDD99 dataset depicts that the proposed method can differentiate anomalous from normal activities. Relatively high sensitivity presents that the model has very low false negative rate.
ACC = (TP+TN)/(TP+FP+TN+FN) (3) SEN = TP/(TP+FN) (4) SPE = TN/(TN+FP)
Based on the experiments above, Kyoto2006++ dataset gives lower results in all three evaluation criteria. The optimal parameter in both datasets is different, that is, their U and O combination are (0.2, 4) and (0.1, 6) for KDD99 and Kyoto2006, respectively. This is because their characteristics are different. It is indicated by the number of clusters extracting from recursive clustering. In KDD99 dataset, the number of cluster is relatively stable with min, average and max are 6, 9.15 and 12, respectively; while those of Kyoto2006++ dataset are 6, 32.5 and 73, resepectively. This shows that Kyoto2006++ is more heterogen than KDD99.
Some interesting results from our proposed methods is that less impurity index does not always show improvement in the evaluation criteria such as in the experiment with KDD99. Experiment with U=0.2 produces significant improvement compared to that with U=0.1.
Conclusions and Future Works
Based on the experimental results, the proposed method gives the best results on KDD99 dataset with O and U parameter 0.2 and 4 while on Kyoto2006++ our proposed method gives the best results with parameter 0.1 and 6.
While more study is certainly needed to validate our method in full scale test, this early experiments show promising results. The next problem needs to address is whether this method still holds up for larger set of data. More experiments with different part of the datasets and different parameters are needed to better understand the nature of this method.
Even the proposed method shows good results, some issues are commonly found in anomaly-based IDS which still exist in the experiments. Those problems are:
It still needs to label the training data. In real life, labeled data is relatively hard to obtain due to the nature of the subject. It has not been tested to handle change of trends in test data. It does not differentiate any attack. Even if the connection is correctly detected as anomaly, the proposed method cannot tell the type of attack. In some real life scenarios knowing the type of attack is important.
